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Abstract: The automated documentation of work steps is a requirement of many modern manufac-
turing processes. Especially when it comes to important procedures such as safety critical screw
connections or weld seams, the correct and complete execution of certain manufacturing steps
needs to be properly supervised, e.g., by capturing video snippets of the worker to be checked
in hindsight. Without proper technical and organizational safeguards, such documentation data
carries the potential for covert performance monitoring to the disadvantage of employees. Naïve
documentation architectures interfere with data protection requirements, and thus cannot expect
acceptance of employees. In this paper we outline use cases for automated documentation and
describe an exemplary system architecture of a workflow recognition and documentation system.
We derive privacy protection goals that we address with a suitable security architecture based on
hybrid encryption, secret-sharing among multiple parties and remote attestation of the system to
prevent manipulation. We finally contribute an outlook towards problems and possible solutions
with regards to information that can leak through accessible metadata and with regard to more
modular system architectures, where more sophisticated remote attestation approaches are needed
to ensure the integrity of distributed components.
Keywords: automated video documentation; workflow recognition; privacy-respecting manufactur-
ing technologies; manufacturing security; human-computer interaction
1. Introduction
In recent years, integrating smart and intelligent manufacturing processes into pro-
duction systems has become an increasingly important challenge. A multitude of research
has been conducted regarding interdisciplinary and human-centric approaches to achieve
this goal [1–5]. One realization emerging in the wake of this effort is that many different
technologies and methodologies, e.g., human-machine interaction, networking, artificial in-
telligence (AI), smart sensing and data acquisition, have to be considered. Smart production
facilities of the future will consist of networked, AI-assisted manufacturing environments
in which humans will act and cooperate with the available assistance systems [6]. Increas-
ing AI capabilities will make human work more flexible and more proactively supported
by intelligent machines. A multitude of different sensors will monitor production pro-
cesses for quality assurance reasons, among others, and provide a comprehensive digital
twin of all production processes. In order to take human activities into account both
for human-machine interaction and for proactive assistance and process mapping, pro-
duction environments of the future need to be able to perceive humans and understand
their actions.
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Possible applications for assistance systems of this kind can be found wherever hu-
mans are the central execution agency of the production process. Despite increasing
automation, assembly activities and quality assurance are still carried out by humans in
many companies and in many areas of production even today. In particular, it can be
observed that the human work process is adapted to the conditions of the surrounding
automation. Instead of attaching importance to an intuitive procedure that is familiar to
the human being, the worker is forced, for example, to check components for defects in
short cycle times and then to document them on a PC or sometimes on a portable tablet [7].
As a result, the transfer of detected defects is forgotten or happens inaccurately. Error
slippage leads to poor quality or high rework costs. Simple gesture recognition systems
already make it possible to acquire documentation directly on the component by indicating
and classifying detected defects by pointing with the finger [8]. As a result, additional
documentation efforts are eliminated, error slips are minimized by direct annotation on
the component, and defect positions can be precisely referenced on the digital twin of
the component [3]. Besides error documentation, smart assistance functions have been
examined in the context of numerous other applications as well. Relevant examples in-
clude advanced inspection and quality assurance systems [9–11], effective induction and
training methods [12–14], as well as assistance systems that aim to establish inclusive [15],
non-discriminatory [16] and immersive [17] work environments. In all of these cases,
the detection of the worker and associated innovative interaction modalities offer the
opportunity to develop assistance functions that optimally support human performance
due to intuitive operability. Gesture recognition in combination with speech offers a
form of communication that people use subconsciously and intuitively in everyday life.
These techniques can be used advantageously in many applications of human-machine
communication, especially in production.
Beyond innovations in human-machine interaction, video-based capturing of workers
offers previously unconsidered possibilities for making production more flexible, safer
and more reliable. It allows assistance systems to perceive and interpret the activities
of the worker along with their context of action. Assembly activities no longer have to
be explicitly confirmed, e.g., by pressing a button, if the respective work steps can be
perceived and understood by the smart assembly environment [2]. In addition, individual
reactions to people and functions that guide the worker step by step through the assembly
process can be largely minimized if it is recognized that the assembly result is correct
regardless of the individual procedure [18]. Without disturbing the worker in the execution
of his activities, reached milestones can be proactively documented in the background with
picture evidence, e.g., the bolting of safety-critical points, the quality-assuring inspection
of welding spots or, in the simplest case, the correct insertion of the first-aid kit in the
production of vehicles [19]. Considering the perceptual capabilities that a production
environment gains through video-based acquisition modalities, a myriad of applications
can be developed into truly smart production processes.
However, video-based assistance and documentation systems also have clear down-
sides that have not been addressed sufficiently in the past. While video-based solutions
offer a wide variety of different capture options with only one sensor, they are often criti-
cized for capturing personal information in the sensor data, which leads to privacy and
data security issues. Particularly with regards to widespread video-based surveillance
systems, such as dashcams operated by ride-hailing companies, data privacy concerns
regarding captured video footage have been a topic of public discourse for a while [20].
Recently, the Chinese ride-hailing enterprise Didi Global has been suspended on grounds
of data security and privacy issues, further emphasizing the need for privacy-friendly
data acquisition solutions [21]. While privacy-preserving dashcams have already been
researched [22], to our knowledge there is no proposal for mitigating data privacy risks of
video-based assistance systems in production environments.
A recent survey, conducted among leaders in industry and academia, shows that both
privacy protection and information security are considered to be prime challenges in the
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realization of smart manufacturing environments [5]. Hence, when advanced assistance
and documentation systems acquire large amounts of data, video material in particular, it is
crucial to embed the respective systems in the company processes in a manner that complies
with data protection requirements and involves employees or employee representatives. It
is particularly important to ensure that the data is only processed for legitimate purposes,
such as simplifying work processes, while at the same time ensuring that technical and
organizational measures are in place to prevent any misuse. The surreptitious monitoring
of employees’ work performance and access to video data without the consent of the
recorded data subjects has to be prevented.
In this paper, we describe a technical system architecture for a smart video documen-
tation system (Section 2), for which we systematically derive data protection and data
security requirements (Section 3). As our main contribution, in Section 4, we introduce
an extended system architecture that includes advanced security mechanisms addressing
these requirements and offering a high level of privacy protection for workers. We analyze
the security of our approach and discuss its limitations in Section 5 before describing our
proof-of-concept scenario and comparing our system with previous work in Section 6.
Finally, we conclude with an outlook on possible solutions for more flexible and secure
architectures in Section 7.
2. Basic System Architecture
Since the challenge of adequate data privacy protection in smart manufacturing sys-
tems is still largely unsolved, our goal in this work is to develop mechanisms for protecting
the privacy and informational self-determination of workers subjected to these types of
assistance systems. More concretely, we base our contribution on an existing collabo-
rative manual assembly station, which is fitted with a multitude of sensors to monitor,
supervise and individually assist the worker [2]. We extend this system with suitable
privacy-protection components and integrate our solution into the physical assembly
station as a proof-of-concept implementation. Nevertheless, our findings are generally
applicable for any assistance systems that capture and store video footage of workers. In
this section, we briefly describe the existing assembly station and extract a basic system
design for it. Afterwards we describe how the assembly station can be extended with
components to automatically detect and document critical work steps as video footage.
Based on this abstract system design, we later derive data protection and data security
requirements (Section 3) and develop advanced security mechanisms (Section 4).
Figure 1 shows the assembly station [2] we use as a development platform to imple-
ment our privacy-protection system. The assembly station is fitted with a set of stereo
cameras for tool tracking purposes and a depth-camera for detecting the worker. Further-
more, it features a projector that can present information and instructions about the current
work step directly on the work piece. When the worker begins his task, the assembly station
captures a live video stream from the depth camera, which provides both a video and a
3D point cloud. The assistance system uses the image data stream to automatically detect
the currently executed work step and compares it to a domain-specific workflow model.
Then the worker can be assisted by projecting information for this work step directly on
the work piece. This manual assembly scenario is convenient for our purpose due to its
relative simplicity and self-containment. Since all components shown in Figure 1 operate
locally on a single computer, no network connections must be considered. From a data
protection perspective, the aim is to implement as much system functionality as possible
without having to store personal data. At the same time, there is a need to collect data to
a certain extent for quality assurance and optimization purposes. Our goal is to extend
this assistance system with the secure storage and retrieval of critical work data, without
impeding the informational self-determination of assisted workers.
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s a first step, e extend the asse bly station sho n in Figure 1 with the capability
of retaining videos of critical work procedures for documentation purposes. This can be
done by i t r ti i it t existing orkflo detection. If
a critical work step is detected, a li fl l a personalized video
snippet are generated and persisted on the hard drive. Due to possible delays caused by
the detectio co e t, a ring buffer is introduced to ensure that the first few seconds
of such work steps are not missed. Further ore, the captured documentation should be
linked to the user’s identity for later revie . For this, e ount a smartcard reader near
the asse bly station, which the orker uses to authenticate and log in at the syste before
beginning his task. To be able to view the recorded data in case of an inspection, e.g., due to
a problem with one of the workpieces, the system must also offer the possibility to retrieve
and display the recorded work steps and workflow logs. For simplicity purposes, this is
done by placing a monitor next to the assembly station that shows the recorded videos
to supervisors.
An overview of the resulting system architecture including the described modifications
is given in Figure 2. The documentation system consists of three components. The workflow
recognition extracts the 3D body pose of the current worker from the video feed and the 3D
point cloud of the depth camera. The worker’s current activity is estimated using the 3D
body pose. With constant observation and a graph-based model of the assembly process,
this component is able to tell at any time which step of the process the worker is currently
doing and what the next steps need to be. It recognizes if the worker diverges from the
optimal path, and it can recognize points of interaction with the workpiece. The component
is able to differentiate critical steps that need to be documented from normal steps using
the assembly model. When recognizing a critical step, the video and critical data of that
assembly step is sent to the storage. The documentation & video storage consists of a file
storage for the raw video data of the assembly steps and a database for the recordings and
corresponding metadata. The database associates the assembled part with the video data
and the worker. The authentication component tells the documentation storage which user is
logged into the system so that it can associate the current recordings to the currently active
worker as well as the unique workpiece ID. Workers can authenticate by holding their
personal smartcard near a reader mounted next to the assembly station. The authentication
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is performed using certificates retrieved from an external user directory service accessed
over the industry standard Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). Besides classical
smartcards, a smartphone can also serve as an authentication token, if it supports near-field
communication (NFC). Using a smartphone for this purpose gives workers access to more
advanced security features offered by the documentation system, which we will cover in
the following sections.
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3. Security and Privacy Model
While the system architecture described above offers automated documentation and
workflow recognition capabilities for smart manufacturing processes, it does not yet deal
with privacy aspects of the recorded video documentation. Workers that are subjected to
automated video documentation have the right of privacy and must not be disproportion-
ately disadvantaged, e.g., by using the recorded videos for covert performance evaluations.
In this section we introduce the necessary protection goals, the attacker model and the
trust model, based on which we will subsequently build a secure and privacy-respecting
system architecture. Our methodology is as follows. We formulate protection goals relative
to assets, e.g., data categories or system components. Based on these e subsequently
categorize attackers by specifying which protection goals they intend to break. Finally, in
the trust model we identify relevant actors regarding the system, their capabilities and
describe as which att ckers they can potentially appear. This modeling helps us, on the
one hand to m ke decisions for ecurity mechanisms and, on the oth r h nd, to analyze
them afterward .
3.1. Protection Goals
As indicated earlier, the primary protection goal we are concerned with is the confi-
dentiality of documentation data in the interest of the data subject, be it video snippets or
workflow protocols. Technical means are supposed to protect the data subject against
covert performance monitoring based on documentation data. This requires that access
to documentation data must be granted by the data subject. We specify this protection
goal even further by requiring that at least one other trusted party besides the data subject
must consent to the access to the documentation data so that the data subject cannot be
pressurized to grant access.
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The data subject as well as the operating organization have an interest in the integrity
and authenticity of documentation data. Both parties are interested in ensuring that docu-
mentation data cannot be manipulated unnoticed. More specifically, this means that no
documentation data is changed, deleted or added unnoticed outside the system behavior
given by the system specification.
To meet these protection goals, we must go even further and demand, as derived
protection goals, that the integrity and authenticity of the smart documentation system is ensured
and that the authenticity of parties accessing documentation data is verified. The former
protection goal ensures that the smart documentation system cannot be manipulated or
even replaced unnoticed.
We do not cover protection goals on metadata, which are used to retrieve documen-
tation data and to request authentication of the parties before access, since the approach
presented in this paper is not capable of restricting access to metadata and preventing
potential leaks of sensitive information that could be derived from metadata. However, we
discuss this question as well as envisioned countermeasures in Section 5.
3.2. Attacker Model
We now characterize abstract attackers by what protection goals they try to break. We
consider a privacy attacker, a modifying attacker and a destructive attacker as a subtype of
the modifying attacker.
The privacy attacker aims to break the confidentiality of documentation data. This
attacker can be represented by the operating organization or employer and attempts to
access documentation data in violation of agreements made in order to gain insight into
the performance of its employees. As described in Section 3.1, this attacker can also achieve
his goal by manipulating or replacing the smart documentation system with a seemingly
identical but insecure system.
The modifying attacker tries to break the protection goal of the integrity and authenticity
of the documentation data so to fabricate evidence. He can be represented by the data
subject trying to disguise errors that occurred during the execution of his work and that
have been captured by the smart documentation system. Alternatively, he could try
to remove the link between an error and himself. The modifying attacker can also be
represented by the operating organization or employer acting with the motivation of
foisting an error on an employee. A special case of the modifying attacker is a destructive
attacker, who wants to delete a data record in order to destroy evidence. Both the operator
and the worker could pursue this interest.
We thus consider only internal attackers within an organization. We exclude external
attackers by assuming that the smart documentation system is operated within an access-
restricted building and by assuming that the attackers considered subsume the attack
vectors and possibilities of external attackers.
3.3. Trust Model
The trust model describes the actors of interest in terms of operation, use and the
protection goals introduced in Section 3.1. We discuss with respect to what protection goals
an actor is trusted or untrusted, i.e., may act as an attacker in the latter case.
The first actor to be considered is the worker as the data subject. Data associated to
this actor is processed by the smart documentation system. The worker is interested in the
protection goals of confidentiality as well as integrity and authenticity of documentation
data. Nevertheless, the worker is not fully trusted as he may have an interest in acting
as a modifying attacker, e.g., to disguise evidence of errors by modification or deletion of
documentation data.
The system supplier creates the smart documentation system and puts it into operation.
We accept him as fully trustworthy. This means that he has no interest in breaking protection
goals, nor does he support any other actor in breaking protection goals. We cannot avoid
this assumption because the system supplier is also responsible for the integration and
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 7339 7 of 19
configuration of security features. The system supplier has administrative rights on the
system, which he uses after commissioning for maintenance purposes only. However, we
neglect the case of system maintenance in this work as we consider the system supplier as
fully trusted.
The operating organization is the main antagonist of the primary protection goal of
confidentiality of documentation data. We represent the operating organization through
its system administrator who has administrative rights on the documentation system. We
concede that he can become a privacy attacker at the direction of the organization’s man-
agement, attempting to break the confidentiality of the documentation data by means of his
privileges and capabilities. The system administrator is also not fully trusted with respect
to the integrity and authenticity of the documentation data, which he may attempt to
compromise at the direction of management, i.e., he may also become a modifying attacker.
Both as a privacy attacker and as a modifying attacker, the system administrator may also
attempt to target the derived protection goals of integrity and authenticity of the smart
documentation system to achieve his attacker interests.
Finally, we introduce a trusted party within the operating organization, i.e., an actor
whom the worker can trust sufficiently to protect his privacy interests. This party is autho-
rized to agree with the operating organization under which technical and organizational
conditions the smart documentation system can be implemented in the organization. We
introduce this party as a trustworthy subject representing, for example, the works council of
the operating organization. The trustworthy subject takes an examining stance towards the
smart documentation system and the corresponding organizational processes, which we
need for the system design introduced in the following section.
4. Privacy-Preserving System Design
In order to achieve the identified protection goals under the previously presented
attack and trust model, we develop and implement 4Crypt—A privacy-preserving video
documentation system for smart manufacturing applications. Our system allows the
continuous monitoring and logging of critical manufacturing steps using off-the-shelf
video equipment, while still protecting the privacy interests of recorded workers. For
this, 4Crypt automatically encrypts all captured video footage and securely distributes the
encryption keys to a set of trusted individuals using a secret-sharing protocol. Decrypting
the videos is only possible with the consent of both the recorded worker and at least one of
the employee’s trusted representatives. This application of the 4-eyes principle prevents
the employer from pressuring workers into yielding keys required to decrypt videos
without legitimate cause. As a result, the 4Crypt system protects the recorded worker
from illegitimate surveillance and covert performance evaluation, while still allowing
the employer to reap the benefits of an automated video documentation and workflow
recognition. Furthermore, 4Crypt provides strong cryptographic security guarantees
against malicious interfering and tampering with the privacy-protection modules. Workers
can verify the integrity of the 4Crypt system by using their personal smartphone on a
dedicated NFC-reader, which prevents the system operator from disabling the encryption
layer or extracting any encryption keys. This is achieved by adding a trusted platform
module (TPM) to each system and by implementing a remote attestation protocol over NFC.
With 4Crypt we extend the basic version of our smart video documentation system
presented in Section 2 by a number of privacy-protection components, most importantly an
encryption/decryption module as well as a TPM-based attestation service. The resulting
system design is presented in Figure 3 with new components shown in yellow.
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The main idea of 4Crypt is to ad a transparent encryption layer into the video
processing pipeline, which implements a hybrid encryption scheme that restricts the
employer’s access to captured video files. In the following sections we describe the three
main tasks of 4Crypt and how they were solved in greater detail. ore concretely, 4Crypt
needs to:
1. Record, encrypt and securely store videos in a way that even the system operator
cannot access them.
2. Retrieve a stored video with consent from both the recorded worker and at least one
of the employee’s trusted representatives.
3. Offer a way of verifying the integrity of the protection components before a worker
begins with a monitored work step.
4.1. Video Encryption
Whenever a worker executes a critical work step in the manufacturing process, a new
video should be recorded for documentation purposes. This video needs to be encrypted
in a way that it is accessible only for the recorded worker in cooperation with at least
one of the trusted representatives. In order to achieve this requirement, we developed a
multi-level encryption scheme that includes a suitable secret-sharing mechanism for the
encryption keys (c.f. Figure 4).
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Secret-sharing schemes as described in [23] are well-researched methods to distribute
a specific secret to a set of participants without disclosing the secret to any one party.
Participants only receive a so-called share of the secret, which in itself does not contain any
information. Only when a certain number of participants disclose their respective share,
the underlying secret can be recovered.
The 4Crypt system implements an encryption scheme that uses a secret-sharing
algorithm to distribute encryption keys to a number of trusted individuals. The details of
this key-sharing mechanism are shown in Figure 4, with key usages displayed as arrows.
4Crypt automatically encrypts recorded videos with a randomly drawn, symmetric video
file key (VFK). In Figure 4, this is displayed in the bottom two levels for an exemplary
video file. The video file keys are not known to either the recorded worker, the trusted
representatives, or the employer. Instead, they remain stored on the documentation system
and are themselves encrypted with one or more group access keys (GAK). A video-specific
group access key is created by randomly drawing one symmetric key share ki for each
group member (either a worker or a trusted representative) and then performing a bitwise
XOR-operation on the shares. In Figure 4, this is shown in the top two levels, with the
XOR-operation denoted by the symbol ⊕. As a result, the group access keys can only be
recovered by collecting the key shares of all participants in the respective group. Finally,
the key shares are asymmetrically encrypted using the public keys of the respective group
members and stored on the documentation system. This encryption scheme allows 4Crypt
to securely store videos in a way that they can only be recovered if all members of at least
one group consent by disclosing their video-specific key shares.
The resulting video acquisition and encryption process based on this key sharing
architecture is shown in Figure 5. At first, the worker w authenticates and logs in by
holding his personal smartphone on the NFC-reader near the assembly station. Once the
critical work step is about to be performed, 4Crypt initiates the recording process. The
video documentation system then creates a new symmetric encryption key v f k for the
video file. Furthermore, a new group access key gak has to be created for each configured
group consisting of the authenticated worker w and a set of n trusted representatives. For
this, the documentation system generates a set of random key shares k j for each member of
the group and calculates the group access key gak by XORing them together. The key share
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kw of the worker is sent back to the worker’s smartphone over NFC to asymmetrically sign
and encrypt it with the worker’s private/public keys. The key shares of the other group
members are encrypted with the respective public key retrieved from the external LDAP
service. All encrypted/signed key shares are then stored in the local key store. Finally, the
video file key is encrypted with each group access key and deposited in the key store as
well. Once the recording has been initialized in that way, each video image captured by
the cameras mounted at the assembly station is automatically encrypted with the video
file key.
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4.2. Video Retrieval
In order to retrieve and display a previously recorded video, it has to be decrypted
on the documentation system. For this, all members of at least one group must consent to
the decryption of the video by disclosing their respective key share. Figure 6 shows the
process of a video decryption in 4Crypt.
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At first, the worker that has been recorded authenticates by holding his smartphone
on the NFC-reader and selecting the video that should be displayed. This retrieves the
video-specific, encrypted key shares of all necessary group members from the key store.
To prevent a modifying attacker from foisting a faked video on the worker (c.f. Section 5),
his key share kw is decrypted and its signature σw is verified on the smartphone. Similarly,
each member of the selected group (usually a set of trusted representatives) must decrypt
their respective key share k j by holding their smartcards on the NFC-reader as well. Once
all group members including the recorded worker have consented to the video disclosure
in that way, the group access key gak can be restored by XORing all decrypted key shares.
Then the video file key v f k is retrieved from the key store and decrypted using the group
access key. Finally, the video frames are decrypted using the video file key and shown on
the connected display.
4.3. Integrity Verification
In the previous sections we have shown how 4Crypt encrypts video files and imple-
ments a s cret-sharing alg rithm on the cryptographic keys to enforce consent of both
the worker and a set of t usted representatives before videos ar disclosed. This solution
prevents the employer from decrypting any videos by himself in order to use them for
illegitimate purposes such as the covert perform ce evaluation of workers. However,
Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 7339 12 of 19
since the employer operates 4Crypt alongside the video surveillance system, he has compre-
hensive physical access to the 4Crypt hardware and software. Hence, the employer could
simply turn off the privacy-protection modules and bypass the encryption altogether by
proactively tampering with the 4Crypt system components directly on the machine. Since
the goal of 4Crypt is to protect the privacy interests of recorded workers against a malicious
employer abusing the video documentation system, why should the workers trust the
employer with setting up 4Crypt correctly in the first place? Due to this consideration,
it is necessary to give the workers the opportunity to verify the integrity of the 4Crypt
privacy-protection modules before being subjected to the video surveillance. That way the
workers would be able to detect malicious tampering with the 4Crypt system or confirm
that their privacy is in fact being protected before starting a supervised work step.
In 4Crypt, we enable workers to confirm the integrity of the documentation system
by adding trusted platform modules (TPMs) to the system design. A TPM is a dedicated
hardware chip that extends a computer with basic security related features. TPMs operate
as trusted hardware security modules and are always designed according to a specification
developed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [24]. Each TPM holds several crypto-
graphic keys that can be used to encrypt data, identify the computer system and attest to
its current software stack. For this, the TPM contains volatile platform configuration registers
(PCRs) that can be used to measure the current hardware and software configuration as
an unforgeable fingerprint. During a trusted boot sequence each boot stage hashes the
software stack of the next stage and writes this measurement into the PCRs. By extending
these measurements all the way up to the user applications and their configuration, the
fingerprints accumulated in the PCRs uniquely represent the current state of the software
stack that is running on the measured system.
Building on this measurement process, an external third party can remotely verify that
the measured system is running a certain software stack in a certain state. This process is
called remote attestation. During a remote attestation, the external verifier requests the log of
the conducted measurements along with a so-called quote, which contains the fingerprints
collected during the measured boot sequence and serves as proof of the current system
state. In order to prevent the challenged system from lying about the fingerprints stored
in its PCR registers, the remote verifier checks that the provided quote is signed by the
TPM with a valid attestation identity key (AIK). The AIK is an asymmetric cryptographic
key pair that has been created by the TPM during a prior enrollment phase. While the
public part of the AIK is known to all involved participants (usually it is certified by a
trusted party), the private key never leaves the TPM. Hence if the quote signature is correct,
the verifier is convinced that the system under test did not lie about its fingerprints in
the measurement log. Then the verifier evaluates the measurement log and confirms that
the measured fingerprints of the applications running on the remote system match the
expected fingerprints of a correctly configured and unmodified software stack.
By utilizing this TPM-based remote attestation technique in 4Crypt, we give workers
the opportunity to verify if the documentation system is trustworthy before stepping in
front of the video cameras. For this we add a TPM to the 4Crypt machine and conduct a
measured boot sequence that includes measurements of the 4Crypt software and its config-
uration. The measurements are performed on a Linux machine with TrustedGRUB [25]
and the Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) developed by Sailer et al. [26], which
since has been integrated in the Linux kernel. As a result, each 4Crypt system can prove
that it has not been maliciously modified by presenting its measurement log and a corre-
sponding quote. These measurements can then be compared to valid fingerprints of an
unmodified 4Crypt software stack that have been deposited at a trusted third party (TTP)
during the deployment of the documentation system. To facilitate the verification process
of 4Crypt systems, we designed and implemented a remote attestation protocol that can
be executed over NFC. This allows workers to install an Android application on their
personal smartphones and use it to attest the integrity of any 4Crypt system by simply
holding their phone near the provided NFC-reader. We execute our attestation protocol
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in conjunction with the smartphone-based authentication of the worker that takes place
before each recorded work step. That way the remote attestation seamlessly integrates
into the normal operation of the video documentation system. Figure 7 shows how our
NFC-capable remote attestation protocol works on a high level. We implemented this
protocol in accordance with the Trusted Attestation Protocol (TAP) that has recently been
standardized by the Trusted Computing Group [27]. For the attestation service on the
documentation system, we use JavaCard and Google’s gRPC framework [28]. For the
Android application we implemented a custom-built NFC service handler.
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henever a worker holds his smartphone near the NFC-reader at the assembly station,
a fresh nonce is randomly drawn and transmitted over NFC to the attestation service
running on the 4Crypt system. The attestation service then uses the TPM to create a signed
quote that includes the current fingerprints stored in the PCRs as well as the received nonce.
The quote and its signature are then transmitted back to the smartphone and verified.
This verification process consists of three steps. First, the verifier checks if the previously
selected nonce is in fact contained in the quote. This prevents the prover from reusing old
quotes in a replay attack. Then the verifier checks the validity of the quote signature under
the known AIK public key. If this is successful as well, the verifier finally must evaluate
whether the attested fingerprints match the unmodified 4Crypt system. For this the verifier
retrieves a set of valid fingerprints from the trusted third party and compares them to the
fingerprints contained in the quote. If all verification steps are successful, the Android
application shows that the worker can trust the video documentation system. If instead the
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attestation process reveals that the documentation system has been modified, the Android
application stores the signed quote as proof of the illegitimate system modification. Then
the worker can safely refuse to operate under video surveillance without having to fear
negative repercussions by the employer.
5. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze to what extent the system architecture presented in the
previous section meets the protection goals introduced in Section 3, given the considered
attackers and the assumed trust relationships.
5.1. Assumptions
In order to focus the security analysis on the extended system architecture, we first
need to introduce some additional assumptions. We assume that all hardware and software
components, especially including the TPM 2.0 and the operating system (ROS2), are trusted.
For the software components, this means that they are implemented correctly, are free of
bugs and are configured correctly once they are put into operation by the system supplier.
Video streams between the sensors/cameras and the smart documentation system are
transmitted over an encrypted channel, which we assume to be secure. We also assume
that current state-of-the-art cryptographic methods from established libraries are used
and that they can be considered cryptographically secure. Regarding the deployment
of the smart documentation system, we assume that it is integrated into a collaborative
manual assembly station as described in Section 2. We also assume that valid system
states accepted by the integrity verification mechanism presented in Section 4.3 do not
contain any kind of remote access, such as SSH. The last two assumptions mean that
system administrators must also log in to the documentation system locally, so that they
would be seen by a worker who is currently using the system. Regarding attestation,
we assume that the trusted system supplier maintains valid system states of the 4Crypt
system at the TTP, which makes them available for the attestation service. The mobile
applications that the worker uses for attestation and authentication on his private device
are also provided by the system supplier and assumed to be trusted. Wherever password
authentication of users/administrators is possible, we assume that strong passwords are
used. We exclude social engineering from the analysis, which means that passwords and
PINs from smartphones and smartcards must be considered unattainable to attackers.
5.2. Attack Vectors
We first introduce the attack vectors of the attackers. The privacy attacker wants to get
hold of documentation data in plain text. Since the encryption is assumed to be secure, the
points in time when the data is available in unencrypted form and how it could be accessed
in these situations have to be considered. The first occurrence of documentation data on
the system in plain text is when it is temporarily stored on disk prior to encryption. The
privacy attacker would need to gain access to the system with the appropriate permissions
and read the data before the plaintext is deleted immediately after encryption. Given the
throughput of AES on current CPU, the duration of the time span to at least read out parts
of the video prior to encryption is dominated by the duration of the video recording. The
second time is when a data item is decrypted, i.e., when accessed by authorized parties.
Again, the privacy attacker must gain access to the system while this access is taking place.
The privacy attacker may replace users’ certificates to impersonate authorized parties
during a regular request to access documentation data. Finally, the privacy attacker may
also attempt to prevent documentation data from being encrypted at all by replacing the
entire system with an apparently identical system.
The modifying attacker aims to create inconsistencies by modifying documentation
data. We distinguish between two goals here: to authentically modify an encrypted video
and to add an apparently authentic video. To authentically modify an encrypted video, e.g.,
to shorten it so that an error that occurred is no longer visible, he would have to become a
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privacy attacker, i.e., he would have to overcome the privacy attacker’s attack vector and
the same hurdles. In order to create a seemingly authentic video, for example, by re-using
an old video documenting an error to a worker, the modifying attacker must be able to
reproduce the encryption and signature steps for the fake video in such a way that the
process goes unnoticed. The destructive attacker wants to delete an encrypted video. To
do this, he must gain access to the system with the appropriate permissions.
5.3. Countermeasures
We begin our analysis with the privacy attacker’s attack vectors. In the first case,
tapping a video at the time before it was encrypted, immediately after recording, cannot be
prevented completely because the operating system’s access control mechanisms cannot
protect against a system administrator acting as a privacy attacker. With his privileged
permissions, he can copy an unencrypted video to another location before it is deleted and
he can also execute programs to automatize attacks. However, this kind of attack is made
considerably more difficult by two circumstances. First, it cannot be carried out remotely,
because even an attacking administrator does not have remote access, so the attacker would
be observed by the worker. Second, the integrity verification mechanism from Section 4.1
ensures that manipulation of the smart documentation system, for example, by starting
a program for automatizing an attack, can only take place after the worker has already
attested the smart documentation system and started his work. Furthermore, the system
would have to be restarted in time to prevent a failed attestation by the next user/worker
after an attack. We therefore argue that this kind of attack can neither be automated nor
scaled and becomes unattractive for the privacy attacker, who is interested in obtaining
multiple videos to gain surreptitious insights into the work performance of employees. The
second case is similar for the system administrator attacking on the employer’s instructions.
He must be on site to manually copy the video just decrypted by the authorized parties
to another location. With the limitation to a single video, to which the authorized parties
already allow access to anyway, this does not seem to be a particularly attractive profit for
the privacy attacker. For the third attack vector, the attacking system administrator would
need to replace certificates of workers in the directory service for authentication and in
the key store for encryption. The first step is possible, since we do not trust the directory
service, but it does not achieve the goal on its own, since it still does not enable video
decryption. The second step of this attack is complicated by the fact that the key store is
part of the attestation process according to Section 4.3. As in the prior cases, the attacker
would have to be on site, act after the attestation has been performed by the worker and
reset the system before another attestation by a worker takes place. Otherwise at least one
attestation would fail. For the fourth attack vector, the attacker completely replaces the
smart documentation system. However, this attack must again fail because the attacking
administrator cannot generate a TPM quote for the forged system that is indistinguishable
from a valid state of the real system.
The modifying attacker’s first attack vector, i.e., to authentically modify an encrypted
video, requires a successful privacy attacker’s attack which has been discussed previously,
and which is even harder to conduct by a worker without a privileged user account. Hence
only the second attack vector remains to be analyzed: to create a seemingly authentic video
foisting an error on somebody else. We consider the case of the system administrator acting
as a modifying attacker. We assume that the attacking administrator has a video sequence
in plain text that is indistinguishable from an authentic video. We further assume that he
can use functions of the components of the smart documentation system, so that he can
easily generate partial keys and encrypt them with any public keys from the key store.
However, the attacking administrator cannot perform a crucial step: he cannot forge the
signature over a timestamp and the key share of the worker to whom the video is to be
foisted because he cannot get hold of the worker’s private key, which does not leave the
trusted private smartphone. For a worker acting as a modifying attacker, this attack vector
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does not exist, since he cannot use the components of the smart documentation system as
he wishes and has no access to the personal smartphones of other workers.
Finally, the destructive attacker remains to be considered. The attack to delete an
encrypted video is possible for an attacking administrator because the operating system’s
access control mechanism is not effective against him. However, the absence of the video
would be noticed once a search for the workpiece in question did not return any hit. The
mechanisms of the operating system are, however, effective against a worker acting as a
destructive attacker, so that it is not possible for him to delete a video.
5.4. Limitations
Before summarizing our security analysis given the protection goals, we briefly discuss
some limitations of our approach. First, there are the known limitations of TPM-based in-
tegrity attestation against internal attackers, particularly with administrative privileges [29].
Conceptionally this only allows us to verify/ensure integrity of a system at the time-of-
check, which means that manipulations at the time-of-use cannot be excluded entirely.
Possible solutions draw on more advanced trusted computing technologies, i.e., trusted
execution environments such as Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX). The second
aspect to discuss is the monolithic system deployment we assume in our approach. For dis-
tributed architectures, i.e., with our components running on different computing resources,
the described integrity verification mechanism is not sufficient anymore. If we, for instance,
separate the workflow recognition component from the documentation component, the
former would have to ensure the trustworthiness of the latter so that, as a consequence,
a transitive attestation mechanism according to the trust chain of components would be
required. Finally, our approach does not protect against information leaks via metadata. If
we can query the smart documentation system for documentation data as we wish and if
the system then reveals whose authentication is required to access these records, an attacker
might be able to derive some statistical estimates about particular workers’ performances
(e.g., in terms of the more records per time unit the better).
5.5. Summary/Fulfillment of the Protection Goals
Considering the assumptions given in Section 5.1 and the limitations described above,
we consider the protection goals to be met. Revisiting our assumptions, the most problem-
atic in practice are the monolithic deployment with all system components running on one
computing resource and the exclusion of remote access for the administrator. The former
issue is subject of ongoing work with more advanced trusted computing technologies,
which can also alleviate the conceptional limitation of TPMs that leads to the latter issue.
6. Application and Results
The work presented in this paper was prototypically integrated into a manual as-
sembly workstation and can be applied to a multitude of real-world use cases. In this
section we describe the proof-of-concept application of a safety-critical screw connection
and briefly discuss the benefits of 4Crypt compared to the basic system design presented
in Section 2 as well as previous proposals.
Safety-critical screw connections occur in many production processes, for example in
the manufacturing of vehicles such as cars and planes. These types of screw connections
need to be executed by qualified workers using the right tools with the correct settings (e.g.,
the right amount of torque). As an automated documentation and workflow recognition
system, the 4Crypt system presented in this paper can provide an invaluable instrument
to supervise and document the correct execution of these safety-critical work steps. For
this, both our basic system design (c.f. Section 2) and the extended system design (c.f.
Section 4) include components for worker authentication, workflow recognition and video
documentation. However, only the extended system design encrypts captured videos
and provides an interface for the worker to verify the integrity of the included privacy-
protection mechanisms. In any case, workers first authenticate and log in to 4Crypt by
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holding their personal smartphone on the NFC-reader near the assembly station. By
authenticating the worker prior to any work step, we can determine if the executing
worker is indeed qualified for the task at hand. Simultaneously, a TPM-based remote
attestation protocol is conducted over the same NFC connection. During this attestation
process, unique fingerprints of the assistance system’s current software configuration are
transmitted to the worker’s smartphone. By comparing the fingerprints to expected “good”
values, the smartphone notifies the worker if the privacy-protection mechanisms of the
assistance system can be trusted. Only if these checks are successful, are the cameras
activated and the worker steps in front of the assembly station. During the conducted work
step, the captured video feed is analyzed by the workflow recognition component and
synchronized with a model of the expected workflow. That way the assistance system can
warn the worker if an important work step is missed or executed incorrectly. In case of a
safety-critical screw connection, this could happen if the worker leaves out some screws,
forgets to properly tighten them after placement, uses an unsuitable wrench for the work
step, or grabs the wrong kind of screws from the shelf. Furthermore, the system creates
a textual documentation of the performed work steps for the supervisor and retains the
encrypted video feed in case of a complaint. As described in detail in Section 4, decryption
of the retained video file is only possible if the corresponding worker and at least one of
the employee’s trusted representatives consent to the disclosure by placing their respective
smartphone and/or smartcard on the assembly station’s NFC-reader.
In comparison with previous approaches, our system stands out primarily in the way it
provides strong privacy guarantees for workers. While most existing video documentation
systems do not include privacy-protection components at all, there are some proposals for
more privacy-friendly smart manufacturing environments. These approaches often include
data obfuscation and anonymization schemes [30], retain decentralized data access logs [31],
or define privacy best practices (privacy-by-design) when designing assistance systems for
smart production facilities [32]. However, in all cases it requires trust in the efforts of the
system operator to design and deploy a privacy-respecting smart manufacturing system.
As we motivated in Section 3, this assumption is often unsound since there are clear conflicts
of interests between the employer as system operator and the workers. Our approach
is novel in the way it gives the worker the possibility to cryptographically verify that
nobody can read the captured video documentation without consent, and hence empowers
true informational self-determination. All in all, we have shown in our proof-of-concept
scenario that 4Crypt fulfills the requirements of smart manufacturing environments in
terms of worker assistance, automated process documentation and also with regards to
privacy protection. Analyzing the performance of 4Crypt in actual productive systems
together with industry partners is one of our goals for future work.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we introduced automated documentation and workflow recognition
systems and motivated their utility in smart manufacturing use cases. Based on this we
presented our own design of a smart video documentation system capable of recording
critical work steps and automatically extracting workflow logs during the manufacturing
process. Furthermore, we pointed out the privacy threats and challenges of operating
video documentation systems in situations where workers are being recorded. In order
to minimize the risk of covert performance evaluation by the employer, we proposed and
implemented 4Crypt as a privacy-respecting video documentation system. 4Crypt offers a
multi-level encryption scheme implementing the 4-eyes principle on recorded videos to
prevent the employer from pressuring workers into disclosing videos without proper cause.
Additionally, we designed and implemented a TPM-based remote attestation protocol
that can be executed over NFC. This allows workers to verify the trustworthiness of the
documentation system using their own personal smartphone before stepping in front of
the video cameras. As shown in our concluding security analysis, 4Crypt satisfies the
confidentiality and integrity requirements of both the employer and the workers.
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As future work, we plan to improve the security guarantees of 4Crypt even further by
using advanced trusted execution environments such as Intel’s Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) instead of TPMs. This can reduce the remaining attack vectors identified in Section 5
and prevent information leakage via metadata. Furthermore, we want to refine the 4Crypt
architecture with regards to a more modular system design, which would allow 4Crypt to
support more flexible use cases in distributed environments.
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